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This article seeks to situate pharmacological cognitive enhancement as part of a 
broader relationship between cultural understandings of the body-brain and the 
political economy. It is the body of the worker that forms the intersection of this 
relationship and through which it comes to be enacted and experienced. In this article, 
we investigate the imaginaries that both inform and are reproduced by representations 
of pharmacological cognitive enhancement, drawing on cultural sources such as 
newspaper articles and films, policy documents, and pharmaceutical marketing 
material to illustrate our argument. Through analysis of these diverse cultural sources, 
we argue that the use of pharmaceuticals has come to be seen not only as a way to 
manage our brains, but through this as a means to manage our productive selves, and 
thereby to better manage the economy. We develop three analytical themes. First, we 
consider the cultural representations of the brain in connection with the idea of 
plasticity – captured most graphically in images of morphing - and the representation 
of enhancement as a desirable, inevitable, and almost painless process in which the 
mind-brain realizes its full potential and asserts its will over matter. Following this, we 
explore the social value accorded to productive employment and the contemporary 
(biopolitical) ethos of working on or managing oneself, particularly in respect of 
improving one’s productive performance through cognitive enhancement. Developing 
this, we elaborate a third theme by looking at the moulding of the worker’s productive 
body-brain in relation to the demands of the economic system. 
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‘The average person uses 10% of their brain capacity. Imagine what she could do with 100%’ 
– tagline for the film Lucy (2014) 
‘Everything is possible when you open your mind’ 
– tagline for the film Limitless (2011) 
Introduction 
Papadopoulos (2011: 432) contends that ‘every epoch has its brain’ and that the concept 
of brain plasticity ‘occupies the brain-body imaginary of the contemporary epoch’.1 The 
idea that the capacity of the brain is not fixed, that it is an organ with the potential to 
adapt and change, underpins and finds expression in the current scientific research and 
wider public interest in pharmacological cognitive enhancement. The possibility of 
increasing ‘brain power’ through pharmaceuticals – sometimes referred to colloquially 
as ‘smart drugs’ – has gained considerable prominence in popular culture, science 
magazines, and the wider media, as well as in policy debates.2 For example, in recent 
mainstream big-budget films such as Lucy (2014) and Limitless (2011), drugs with potent 
powers of enhancement enable the central characters to overcome the limitations of the 
‘normal’ human brain and thereby exert their influence on the world around them. In a 
more modest vein, media reports have discussed ‘normal’ people taking drugs believed 
to enhance cognition in the context of employment, including speculation about ‘How 
Smart Drugs and Cybernetics Could Create a Superhuman Workforce’ (Louv, 2012; see 
also ‘The Pharmaceutical Path to a Superhuman Workforce’, 2012). At the same time, a 
number of prominent policy-orientated reports have discussed the possible economic and 
social benefits of cognitive enhancement drugs (see, for example, Academy of Medical 
Sciences, 2012; British Medical Association, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the distortions of the scientific concept of brain plasticity within its 
popular manifestations in the media and popular culture, the idea that drugs have the 
power to enhance the brain or unlock its potential is consistent with a general turn to 
pharmaceuticals to solve a whole range of problems and achieve desirable ends for 
individuals and society – ‘a pill for every ill’ (Beaconsfield, 1980).3 This tendency has 
been described as ‘pharmaceuticalization’ (Abraham, 2010; Busfield, 2010). It is also 
expressive of the prevalent view of brain functioning as essentially constituted by 
neurochemical processes and interactions, which themselves can be adjusted and 
readjusted through the use of pharmaceuticals. This ‘psychopharmacological imaginary’ 
(Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 12) appears to hold out the promise to help people manage 
not only specific diseases of brain function, but also, importantly, aspects of ordinary 
everyday life (see, for instance, Fox and Ward, 2008; Williams et al., 2008). But at the 
same time as greater control seems to be available through pharmacology, Rose (2007) 
argues that the more we see ourselves in terms of brain chemistry, the more we become 
subject to neurochemical evaluation and intervention. 
Discussion of cognitive enhancement falls broadly into two areas: bioethical debate 
and sociological studies. Ethical discussions centre on two key issues. First, coercion 
versus free choice: whether individuals might seek to enhance themselves out of their 
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own volition, or because they may be required to enhance, or might feel pressured to do 
so, due to working conditions or to keep up with (enhanced) others in education and the 
labour market. The pressures for productivity or profitability, the impetus to reduce the 
costs of labour, and the current move towards more casualized employment conditions 
are some of the main drivers that could lead to coercion to enhance. Ethical debates tend 
to problematize coercion, but do not question what is assumed to be its opposite: ‘free 
choice’. Analysing the context of the contemporary labour market and employment 
relations enables an understanding of the conditions under which this ‘choice’ comes to 
be seen by individual employees or students as possible or desirable. Second, there is the 
question of fairness/equity in the access to such drugs and their outcomes: whether 
consumption of enhancement drugs might give an unfair advantage to some people who 
can afford them over others who cannot (Farah et al., 2004; Greely et al., 2008). 
Sociologically orientated work on cognitive enhancement has tended to use it to 
develop explorations of the concepts of medicalization, biomedicalization (Coveney, 
Gabe, and Williams, 2011) and pharmaceuticalization (Williams et al., 2008). Although 
this is not the focus of these studies, they have made some points on specific political 
economic aspects of cognitive enhancement. In particular, this has been discussed in 
relation to the management of sleep and how the ‘customisation’ and even potential 
‘optionalisation’ of sleep provides opportunities for greater productivity, especially in the 
light of shift work (Coveney, 2011; Williams, Coveney, and Gabe, 2013; WolfMeyer, 
2012). Other research has considered enhancement drugs in relation to the pressures 
associated with the characteristics of contemporary employment – including increasing 
demands for flexible labour, precarity, extreme forms of working, long working hours, 
24/7 availability, and so on (see, for instance, Bloomfield and Dale, 2015; Smith and 
Land, 2014). 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of the issues addressed in such literature, here 
we seek to situate cognitive enhancement as part of a broader relationship between 
cultural understandings of the body-brain and the political economy. It is the body of the 
worker that forms the intersection of this relationship and through which it comes to be 
enacted and experienced. Through our analysis below, we argue that the use of 
pharmaceuticals has come to be seen not only as a way to manage our brains, but through 
this as a means to manage our productive selves, and thereby to better manage the 
economy. More specifically, in this article we investigate the imaginaries that both inform 
and are reproduced by representations of pharmacological cognitive enhancement, 
drawing on cultural sources such as newspaper articles and films, as well as policy 
documents and pharmaceutical marketing material, to illustrate our argument. Previous 
studies have analysed media reporting on drugs such as modafinil (Coveney, Nerlich, and 
Martin, 2009; Williams et al., 2008), or the portrayal of a range of enhancement 
technologies in science fiction (Delgado et al., 2012). However, in this article we analyse 
a range of cultural sources, arguing that despite their differences, they also encapsulate a 
commonality in their construction of images of minds and brains, and their potential for 
enhancement. As the basis for our analysis, we contend that prevalent representations of 
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cognitive enhancement are inextricably intertwined with the contemporary social 
context. As Hogle argues, 
The work that goes into both identifying and amplifying certain characteristics as being 
amenable to change and constructing certain traits as desirable does more than essentialize 
them as preferred human traits. Rather, it forms a circuit of enterprise, biology, medicine, 
and culture in complex relations to each other. In this sense, the traits being enhanced are 
not inherently natural but cultural. (Hogle, 2005: 703) 
We contend that the cognitive traits that are associated with pharmacological 
enhancement are predominantly concerned with making the body more productive and 
thus linked to particular characteristics that are seen as having economic worth, and 
thereby connected to the broader political economic context. 
Enhancement for the purposes of improving work rates is not new. Historical 
examples of pharmacological modification of cognition include the military deployment 
of amphetamines and methamphetamine to improve attention and wakefulness during the 
Second World War (Bloomfield and Dale, 2015; Rasmussen, 2008). We can see this as 
part and parcel of the longstanding relationship between the economy and the body. This 
is captured in Foucault’s remark that ‘in fact the two processes - the accumulation of men 
and the accumulation of capital - cannot be separated’ (Foucault, 1977: 221). Whilst the 
human body is the primary instrument of labour, it is also a significant limitation on it. 
For some time now, the economy has demanded flexibility on the part of the labouring 
body (Martin, 1994), and in the current era of brain plasticity this translates into the idea 
of enhancing cognitive powers. Cognitive enhancement may thus be seen as a form of 
work on the body – an accumulation strategy (Harvey, 1998; Harvey and Haraway, 1995) 
– that aims to reshape it to fit the particular demands of the economy. Indeed, it is very 
noticeable that discussions in the news media of the potential for cognitive enhancement 
through the use of ‘smart drugs’ frequently focus on how this might improve various 
working or studying practices. Modafinil, a stimulant synthesized in the 1970s in the 
context of brain research and sleep, is medically prescribed for conditions such as 
narcolepsy. However, it has been deployed by various military forces (Moreno, 2008) 
and subsequently taken up within wider society as a cognitive enhancer, a ‘smart drug’. 
For example, in 2011 Reuters Health reported on research into whether ‘the sleep-
fighting medication modafinil may boost the brain power of weary surgeons’ (Joelving, 
2011). Similarly, other coverage suggests that enhancement drugs might improve driver 
performance and safety (Diver, 2017; Margo, 2000). In this guise, modafinil has also 
proved particularly popular amongst students (see, for example, Dietz, Soyka, and 
Franke, 2016) and others in high-pressure occupations, even though its efficacy remains 
a subject of scientific debate (see, for instance, Repantis et al., 2010), along with concerns 
about its known side effects. 
Paid work is multifaceted. It is about more than production or making a living. In 
capitalist economies, paid work is a source of social status, social interaction, and social 
identity formation. It has been argued that more and more social relations come to be 
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viewed through the lens of economic worth, such that being ‘productive’ is socially 
valued and validated whilst there is a concomitant demonizing of those who are 
‘unproductive’ (Fleming, 2015; Smith and Riach, 2016). More recently, conditions of 
employment have become framed within the language of what constitutes neoliberalism. 
Mindful of the ubiquitous but often ill-defined use of the term (Flew, 2014; Lemke, 
2002), we limit our reference to neoliberalism specifically to the forms of 
governmentality articulated by Foucault in his lectures of 1978–9. Here he elucidates the 
development of ideas and institutions that promulgate the ‘generalization of the economic 
form of the market...throughout the social body’ (Foucault, 2008: 243) Foucault analyses 
neoliberal developments in relation to biopolitics: the ways in which life itself is ‘put to 
work’. In this conception, where each individual might be seen as a ‘micro-enterprise’, 
investing in themselves to gain the best return on their own self as ‘human capital’, it 
becomes more comprehensible why some people might choose to, or feel they need to, 
turn to smart drugs and other technological interventions in order to succeed, compete, 
or even just survive in this ‘enterprise society’ (ibid.: 226). With the growth of neoliberal 
economics, the focus has shifted to the responsibility of the individual to work on their 
own body and, we would add, their brain. This then becomes part of an individual project 
of self-construction – an ‘ethic of personal self-care and responsibility linked to 
modifying the body’ (Pitts-Taylor, 2010: 639) – whilst remaining tied to the wider 
political economy. It is in this context that we would note there is a continuity between 
students taking cognitive enhancement drugs as a study aid and employees taking them 
to perform better at work. As one prominent headline put it, ‘Students Used to Take 
Drugs to Get High. Now They Take Them to Get Higher Grades’ (Cadwalladr, 2015; cf. 
Williams et al., 2008). Within the context of neoliberal biopolitics articulated by 
Foucault, there is a subtle shift where education becomes one of the means by which 
individuals can improve and actualize their ‘human capital’, postponing earning 
opportunities in the present in order to invest in their future employability and earnings 
potential (Foucault, 2008: 228–30). In the light of this, the consumption of 
pharmaceuticals for cognitive enhancement can be seen as a potential tool for the worker 
acting as an ‘entrepreneur of the self’ (ibid.: 226). One example of pharmacological 
enhancement that perhaps particularly well illustrates its interrelationship with 
contemporary employment is the renewed interest in lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) 
used in very small quantities as a potential spur to creativity, especially in the context of 
occupations such as software engineering (Karim, 2017; Kuchler, 2017). In conditions of 
uncertainty and competition over jobs, even for those in the professions, including the 
much-discussed replacement of human workers with robots and AI and the casualization 
of workers’ contracts and rights in the so-called ‘gig economy’, workers seek for the 
means to reduce their precarity and increase their ‘competitive edge’. In contemporary 
‘knowledge-based economies’, it is the ‘gold in workers’ heads’ that is particularly 
valued, including such skills as creativity and innovation. Thus it is not surprising to find 
enhancement practices focused on these traits. 
In summary, cognitive enhancement resonates with the prevailing political economic 
order, in particular its valuation of productive performance and the associated 
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expectations on individuals to take responsibility for realizing their own potential in order 
to achieve this. We contend that this ethos produces a commonality that runs through the 
seemingly diverse representations of cognitive enhancement that we analyse in this 
paper, ranging from fantasies based upon the acquisition of superhuman skills, through 
cognitive enhancement, to more ‘mundane’ pharmaceutical interventions aimed at 
managing cognitive functions such as alertness and attentiveness, as well as attempts to 
attain greater focus and improved memory. 
Imaginaries of cognitive enhancement 
In order to further explore how cognitive enhancement is represented and understood in 
everyday life, we deploy the analytical term imaginaries as a means of highlighting the 
connection between ideas, imagery, and context (on this, see for example Bloomfield and 
Doolin, 2011; Le Doeuff, 1989; Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne, 2005; Taylor, 2002). 
Imaginaries relate in part to the cultural images and ideas that circulate, as well as to the 
various ways in which people relate to them by interpretation, incorporation, and 
rejection, often contradictorily, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes without intention or 
conscious deliberation. Therefore, we purposefully refer to ‘imaginaries’ in the plural not 
the singular. The imaginaries we explore express contestations and struggles surrounding 
cognitive enhancement. We do not consider here how these imaginaries of enhancement 
are received – it is enough to note that we do not see them as deterministic or predictable 
(O’Connor and Joffe, 2015; Racine and Forlini, 2010). Instead, we aim to elaborate 
specific aspects of the social, cultural, and economic context from which they emerge, 
and which they in turn help reproduce. 
The imaginaries of cognitive enhancement that are explored in this paper are not 
passively derived from current dominant images in society, nor are they simply abstract 
fantasies of how society might be different: They stand in the interstices between such 
images and those future states (Dawney, 2011; Gatens, 1996). Imaginaries have material 
effects; they are intrinsic to the possibilities of action, because they hold out the prospect 
of a future path for the individual and thus motivate desire and choices. Dawney’s (2011: 
538) development of the concept of imaginaries as ‘material, embodied and affective’ 
takes this further: 
Ideas and imaginings do not cause practice: they are practices. In other words, to position 
the imagination in the realm of ideas alone runs the risk of excluding a consideration of the 
immediate, sensate and embodied modes through which imaginaries come to be experienced 
and felt. (ibid.: 539) 
However, imaginaries have a material effect not only for individuals, but also through 
how they come to frame future possibilities through cultural and scientific 
understandings. For example, in 1628 William Harvey described the circulation of the 
blood through the pumping motion of the heart. Since then, the major imaginary of the 
heart as a functional organ has treated it as if it is a pump, even though this ignores 
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important aspects of its electro-biochemical characteristics. In the 20th century, doctors 
worked out how to replace a faulty heart with a device that was indeed very like an 
electrical pump (Laurance, 1995; Dale, 2001: 94–5; Sawday, 1995: 31). 
Our analysis below shows that the contemporary imaginaries of cognitive 
enhancement present in a diversity of sources are significantly embedded in cultural 
constructions of what might be described as ‘the productive body’ (Gue´ry and 
Deleule, 2014): that body which is made fit for work and employment. However, 
beyond the immediate demands of the working body, these imaginaries express 
aspirations for performance that are characterized by an increased emphasis on 
achievement, personal development, and realizing one’s potential. 
The article draws upon a variety of English-language sources of material that refer to 
pharmacological cognitive enhancement deriving from the period 1997 to 2017. The 
selection of a range of sources was shaped to a certain degree by our awareness of the 
interplay or cross-referencing between them. Along with the growing media (including 
Internet) coverage and public discourse surrounding the topic of cognitive enhancement, 
and with its manifestation in popular culture through films such as Limitless and Lucy, it 
was interesting to observe that the latter became drawn upon in those media reports as a 
means of narrating the topic to their audience. Furthermore, informed by other research 
on drugs and the brain that examined the role of industry advertisements (see, for 
instance, Singh, 2007; Tone, 2009), we too chose to consider the marketing materials for 
the drug modafinil. We view our sources as related cultural or social manifestations of 
the notion of brain plasticity in general, and the imaginaries of cognitive enhancement in 
particular. In short, we regard our chosen sources as ‘public fragments of social 
consciousness that work (albeit loosely) in concert, encouraging people to reason, know 
and fashion their worlds in particular ways’ (Kroll-Smith, 2003: 627). Accepting this 
commonality, it is nonetheless useful to distinguish the particular characteristics of the 
sources, as they each have different relations with the portrayal of the enhanced or 
modified brain in everyday life. 
The first category of sources comprises portrayals of cognitive enhancement in 
popular culture, specifically the recent films Limitless and Lucy. Although explicitly 
fictionalized narratives expressing fantasies far from everyday experience and current 
possibilities, they invoke distorted or exaggerated (pseudo)scientific ideas about the brain 
and the possibilities of pharmacological enhancement, and in doing so tap into some key 
desires and anxieties about its implications. 
Second, we draw upon international English-language media reports of 
pharmacological cognitive enhancement, particularly newspaper articles. Whilst at one 
level, some news coverage purports to present factual accounts of scientific 
developments in brain science, neuroenhancement, or the use of ‘smart drugs’ amongst 
particular groups in society, it is also involved in the construction of particular 
imaginaries about such matters. Indeed, since there are currently no drugs that are 
licensed to be prescribed or marketed as cognitive enhancers, these reports are inherently 
involved with the formation of narratives of what these ‘smart drugs’ are and how they 
are used (see Kroll-Smith, 2003). Such accounts typically refer to the off-label use of 
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prescription drugs such as modafinil and Ritalin, usually associated with diagnoses such 
as narcolepsy and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), respectively, but 
consumed (without a medical prescription) by people who have not been given these 
diagnoses, with the aim of improving cognitive function. Scientific studies are mixed in 
their conclusions as to whether brain functioning is improved, and in any case laboratory 
studies are hardly representative of everyday work life. Overall, the drugs predominantly 
promote wakefulness rather than increase cognitive ability. Nevertheless, many media 
accounts relate the (supposed) improvement in brain ability to the possibilities of, or at 
least desire for, increased performance – such as in study or at work – and thus the pursuit 
of self-development promoted by neoliberal discourse. For instance, taking a snapshot of 
coverage in UK national newspapers in 2016 revealed 20 unique reports on the topic of 
modafinil or smart drugs and the brain, of which 18 referred to enhancement (positively 
or negatively) in the context of performance in study or at work.4 We contend that such 
examples draw upon particular ideas and social values – imaginaries – surrounding 
selfrealization, employment, and the social valuation of productive effort (characteristics 
associated with neoliberalism), but at the same time offer imaginaries of cognitive 
enhancement that in turn reproduce those ideas and values. 
The third category we draw upon is marketing material for the drug modafinil (and its 
variants). We chose to concentrate on modafinil, rather than other substances that are 
discussed as enhancers, for several reasons. First, it is the most common substance 
referred to in media reports. Second, there has already been a more formal crossover of 
the drug into work environments: It has been used in the military and discussed in relation 
to long-distance driving as a potential aid to safety, and experiments with it taken place 
in the medical and surgical field (Krueger and Leaman, 2011; Sugden et al., 2012; see 
also Bloomfield and Dale, 2015). Third, there was a meta-analysis of scientific studies of 
modafinil in 2015 (Battleday and Brem, 2015), which led to its being labelled ‘the 
world’s first safe smart drug’ in newspaper reports (Thomson, 2015), thereby increasing 
its visibility. And fourth, the advertisements for modafinil specifically relate its use to 
employment. Official promotional material from the pharmaceutical industry does not 
represent cognitive enhancement as such, since it is not allowed to market drugs for 
anything other than their licensed uses.5 However, we contend that the adverts 
nonetheless offer imaginaries about the relationship between the brain and potential 
pharmaceutical interventions in its functioning; for instance, in terms of restoring 
alertness, attention, or wakefulness in sleep-deprived individuals. The imaginaries 
typically deployed in promoting a drug refer to both its power to transform an individual’s 
condition and the future self that they hope to become. One of the ways in which industry 
seeks to convey product information to consumers is through the use of narrative devices 
and associated imagery centred on clearly recognizable as well as believable characters; 
individuals that one can identify with. In this regard, the promotional material for 
pharmacological drugs is often no different (see Frosch et al., 2007; Rasmussen, 2008; 
Singh, 2007; Tone, 2009). Such material and its associated imaginaries present possible 
identities that the observer can ‘try on’ to see if they would fit into the imagined future 
that is portrayed therein. The envisaged use of the product that is being promoted may 
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thus become thinkable as a first step towards its actually being acquired. Moreover, 
imagined futures have an emotional component, and this is exploited in a number of 
advertising campaigns for various pharmaceutical drugs (Frosch et al., 2007). 
There is also unofficial, unregulated marketing material from online retailers who 
overtly promote the supposed cognitive enhancement potential of these drugs, with some 
making an explicit link to the Limitless film, offering the ‘real’ smart drug. This material 
includes narratives that are presented as the experiences of those who have tried the drugs 
(though obviously this cannot be verified, and the experiences are clearly portrayed in a 
particular way, since they are made available on sites designed to promote the sales of 
the drugs). It also includes online discussions between users, and other information that 
is presented as factual about the drugs. 
Fourth, we draw upon two policy reports that have been published in the UK on the 
use of drugs for the purposes of enhancement: the Academy of Medical Sciences 2012 
report on Human Enhancement and the Future of Work, and the British Medical 
Association’s 2007 publication Boosting Your Brainpower: Ethical Aspects of Cognitive 
Enhancement. These are relevant because they bring in discussions that cut across the 
scientific and policy communities and seek to construct future-orientated activity, 
especially with regard to the economy. 
As we have already noted, despite the seeming diversity of these materials, it is the 
strands of commonality between them that enable us to better understand the ways in 
which the associated representations of the brain relate to the cultural context out of 
which imaginaries of enhancement emerge as immanent potentialities. This can be shown 
by briefly illustrating the interrelationships between the different sources. For example, 
newspaper reports pick up on scientific and policy discussions that they then re-present 
in a popular, digestible form. Similarly, references to ‘the real life “Limitless” drug’ can 
be found in newspaper headlines and online pharmacies for modafinil; and reviews of the 
film claim that it was based upon modafinil.6 
Our main argument in what follows is structured according to three analytical themes 
followed by a concluding discussion. In the first of these, Mind over matter?, we explore 
the commonplace imagery of the brain that is deployed in popular coverage of 
enhancement. The second theme, Valuing productivity and performance, examines the 
connection between imaginaries of enhancement and the social valuing of productivity 
and performance, especially in paid employment. The third theme, Enhancing the 
economy, considers how management of the (neoliberal) self is but a microcosm of 
broader managerial efforts to organize the world. Noting Wolf-Meyer’s (2009: 13) point 
about the ‘need to understand the economy as an always embodied practice’, we illustrate 
this theme by reference to efforts to exercise pharmacological control over alertness, 
wakefulness, and sleep. 
Mind over matter? 
In the film Lucy, we see portrayed a fantasy of total control in which the mind-brain has 
power not just over the individual’s body, but the external world too. For example, Lucy 
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is instantly able to accomplish complex tasks involving adept physical coordination by 
the sheer power of thought/knowledge. At the beginning of the film she is unable to drive, 
but once the drug has enhanced her brain she transforms into someone who can skilfully 
weave a car through fast oncoming traffic. Similarly, through the power of the drug Lucy 
can immediately understand languages that she could not previously speak, and is able 
to wield a gun like a professional. The embodied nature of human skill acquisition and 
practice is ignored: Her new abilities are derived internally, as it were, directly from her 
brain power – she just knows what to do and is able to do it. This portrayal of the 
possibilities of cognitive enhancement sidesteps any understanding of how learning 
comes from embodied interaction with the world. Moreover, as Lucy’s powers develop 
she becomes able to exercise telekinetic and other powers over matter itself. Everything 
becomes subject to her will, which can be perfectly enacted because of the realization of 
the full potential of her brain. 
Although easily dismissed as science fiction fantasy, Lucy may be better understood 
as the extension of current lines of thinking pushed to their limits. This imaginary of 
cognitive enhancement shows both connection with and contrast to the current dominant 
‘materialist’ view of the mind-brain, where mind is understood as a property of the brain, 
which is an organ of the body (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 1). Here, on the one hand, 
we see the brain as an organ of the body whose biological capacity can be extended 
through pharmaceutical substances. On the other hand, it is seen as capable of being 
enhanced as if it was autonomous and almost separate from the body, in a way that is 
suggestive of a power of mind that goes beyond its biological nature. This evokes images 
of an enhanced brain, which is now able to ‘pull along’ a body that can be perceived as a 
constraining factor due to its biological limits. Lucy’s body before it is enhanced is weak 
and deficient – she is not able to resist those who forcibly turn her into a drugs mule. 
Once she is at the full extent of her extraordinary pharmaceutical enhancement, however, 
her brain becomes all-powerful – indeed, so much so that the biological body is no longer 
able to contain it, and she becomes a supercomputer before dissolving and leaving her 
superior knowledge behind on a flash drive. In this strange sequence, we see the dream 
of overcoming and even entirely transcending the physical body, a fantasy that resonates 
with a long history of denial and degradation of the body (Turner, 1984). We suggest that 
there is a residual Cartesianism in this imaginary, which coexists and is in tension with 
the prevalent materialist view. 
Within more mundane everyday examples of imaginaries around cognitive 
enhancement we can see similar themes. Newspaper reports about the use of ‘smart 
drugs’ emphasize how they provide a means to transcend biological limits. Headlines 
include ‘In the City That Never Sleeps...Traders Stay Up on “Smart Drugs”’ (Dean, 
2013), ‘Public Servants Used Drug, Modafinil, to Stay Awake to Complete the Federal 
Budget on Time’ (Farr, 2014), ‘Drug-Taking: Think What We’d Achieve If We Never 
Slept a Wink’ (Clay, 2012), and ‘Smart Drug Helps You to Sleep Less and Think More’ 
(Lay, 2015). All of these examples rely on an imaginary where the limits of the tired body 
can be overcome by an enhanced brain. The visual imagery that is often deployed next to 
articles such as these is also telling: for example, a brain with coloured lines radiating out 
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of it, and a brain with sections brightly lit up (Petrow, 2013; Lay, 2015). Again, a notable 
common theme with these pictures is that the brain is shown as a single self-contained 
organ abstracted from the rest of the body; it appears to be able to exist and function alone 
and independently, as a disembodied agent. This somewhat mechanistic view of the brain 
runs through much of the discussion and visual representations of cognitive 
enhancement. 
The problematizing of the body is something that can also be discerned in the official 
adverts for Provigil (an early tradename for modafinil) in the USA. These directly 
promote the use of the drug for patients reporting symptoms of excessive sleepiness (ES). 
For example, a dramatic transformation from sleepiness to alertness is captured explicitly 
in an advert for Provigil that appeared in professional journals such as Psychiatric News.7 
Under the caption ‘Cut through the fog of ES with PROVIGIL’, we see an image of a 
female clinician in the foreground who is striding ahead, bright and alert. In the 
background lurk several other figures, all bearing the trappings of their employment, but 
shrouded in fog and looking tired and deadbeat from their work. A series of related 
images in other adverts similarly portray the ‘before’ and ‘after’ message, with the former 
depicting tired, aching bodies and downcast eyes, and the latter showing figures who – 
after taking modafinil – are energetic, refreshed, and committed to their work. The 
suggestion that is carried through this promotional material is one that poses the 
chemically enhanced brain as a ‘solution’ to the failing body. As Elliott (2003: 13) notes, 
‘Enhancement technologies are usually marketed and sold by taking advantage of a 
person’s perception that she is deficient in some way’. 
The tensions that we see in the imaginaries of cognitive enhancement illustrate the 
complex and continuing power of Cartesianism, with its mind–body dualism, and 
hierarchical assumptions that the mind constitutes the active subject whilst the body is 
mere matter. The ‘brain’ in some ways occupies an ambiguous and ambivalent position: 
Sometimes it is equated with the power of mind (over that of matter), and sometimes it 
is equated with the limitations of that biological matter (as an organ of the body). 
Furthermore, despite the prevalent idea that the mind is now embodied in the brain, which 
is another organ of the body, there is an assumption that enhancing the mind-brain can 
be secured without risk or detriment to the passive body, with ‘side effects’ considerably 
downplayed. 
The transformations of the body-brain depicted in films such as Limitless and Lucy, 
as well as in the adverts discussed above and in cultural representations of enhancement 
more generally, can be further analysed in terms of Sobchack’s (2000) discussion of 
‘morphing’. This is a technique deployed in cinematic representations of radical bodily 
transformation. These metamorphoses depict bodily changes without any of the ‘natural’ 
biological processes involved; they are about ‘making visible (and seemingly effortless) 
incredible alterations of an unprecedented plastic and elastic human body’ (ibid.: 45). In 
doing this, they ignore, obscure, or even write out the time and pain involved in the 
experience of bodily change: ‘transformation without time, without effort, without cost’ 
(ibid.: 50). For example, in Limitless radical cognitive enhancement is achieved (and 
sustained) through taking a fictional drug, ‘NZT-48’. In this case, biological processes 
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and time are doubly removed. First, because once a pill is consumed it moves from the 
outside to the inside of the body, and the changes it instigates themselves become 
invisible and no longer consciously thought of (Martin, 2006). Second, because the 
(imagined) changes of enhancement are refracted through the remnants of the Cartesian 
body. Thus, the dominant imaginary runs, these drugs produce specifically cognitive 
enhancement. Aside from the resultant powers that are bestowed by the pill (an ability to 
play the piano or speak other languages inevitably requires the body to behave differently, 
even if this is not acknowledged), the only sustained bodily changes that we see are 
relayed by a pronounced brightening of Eddie Morra’s (the central character) irises. They 
seem to radiate, indexing cognitive prowess. Dramatic negative effects are visited on the 
body, but only as a consequence of the drug wearing off, the effects being quickly 
reversed once the drug is consumed again. There is thus an asymmetry as regards bodily 
processes: a seamless, almost disembodied transition to enhanced powers through the 
presence of the drug, and then a body rendered lumpen and dazed by its absence. 
The plasticity that is assumed and represented in morphing techniques can be related 
to the dominant image of the plasticity of the brain. But as Sobchack (2000: 45) notes, 
this plasticity comes with connotations and consequences for embodiment and social 
relations, ‘rendering human affective states with unprecedented superficiality and 
literalism’. At the same time, ‘the plasticity of the image (and our imagination) has 
overwhelmed the reality of the flesh and its limits’ (ibid.: 50). The bodily nature of the 
brain, with its biological time and processes, its emotions and interconnections, is 
effectively written out. Through this, the brain becomes rendered open to 
commodification and instrumentalism, both for the individual and within the broader 
political economy. Featherstone (1991) notes that the body in contemporary consumerist 
culture has become seen and experienced as plastic, and hence a lifestyle accessory, a 
thing to be sculpted, shaped, and ‘stylized’. Similarly, Emily Martin develops this theme 
in Flexible Bodies, here placing it in an economic context, and arguing that ‘flexibility is 
an object of desire for nearly everyone’s personality, body and organisation’ (Martin, 
1994: xvii). 
In the next section, we further develop our analysis by discussing how the impetus to 
overcome the limitations of the body-brain through cognitive enhancement is socially 
and morally legitimated in relation to the imperative to be an economically active and 
productive subject. 
Valuing productivity and performance 
The potential to enhance the brain is linked to the high valuation that capitalist societies 
put on productivity, and thus on being a productive person. An article in the New Yorker 
entitled ‘Brain Gain: The Underground World of “Neuroenhancing” Drugs’ (Talbot, 
2009) tells of a Harvard graduate who as a student regularly took Adderall as a study 
aid.8 His summing up of this: ‘Productivity is a good thing’. Another account in this 
article tells of someone who works with a colleague who takes modafinil and, in contrast 
to them, is seen by their boss as a problem ‘for not being as productive’. A third story is 
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of an older person experimenting with modafinil, who believes he is ‘performing a little 
better’. The moral of this particular smart drug tale is that productivity is good, and hence 
achieving it through pharmaceutical means is also good. The rhetoric of productivity, and 
the expectation that the individual will work on their ability to be productive, legitimates 
the use of smart drugs. 
Imaginaries of cognitive enhancement are closely entwined with cultural norms and 
values of productivity and performance. At the level of the individual, there is an 
expectation that in order to legitimately participate within society, one has to be a 
productive person. For example, this underpins the argument of the Academy of Medical 
Sciences report Human Enhancement and the Future of Work: 
Enhancement could enable more people to work at their full biological capacity and to meet 
necessary entry requirements for an occupation, which could result in a rise in standards or 
potentially greater opportunity and diversity at work. Individuals with lower cognitive 
abilities tend to have less choice of occupations, but enhancement may enable them to 
compete and thus have greater choice. (Academy of Medical Sciences, 2012: 44) 
This articulation indicates a key shift in the contemporary relationship between the 
individual employee and their place in the labour market. The language is that of choice 
and competition, but in the sense that the individual, in order to have greater opportunities 
in their working life, has a ‘choice’ of enhancing themselves so they can better compete 
with others. The significance of this can be further seen in imaginaries of cognitive 
enhancement that find expression in popular culture. One of the straplines for the film 
Limitless is, ‘What if a pill could make you rich and powerful?’. Similarly, newspaper 
articles and blogs are headed: ‘Nootropics [substances that improve mental function]: 
Can These Smart Drugs Super-Charge Your Career?’ (‘Nootropics’, 2013);9 ‘Smart’ 
drugs are coming to the office - to make you sharper, stronger...better” (Metro, 1st June 
2016);10 and ‘How (and Why) to Use Nootropics to Boost Productivity and Performance’ 
(‘How (and Why) to Use Nootropics’, 2016). It is noticeable that these headlines address 
the individual worker directly. 
In this framing, then, there is a sense in which the worker is expected to want to make 
themselves more employable, in order to achieve their own full potential and self-
actualization. From this perspective, it is the worker who has to ensure that they are fit 
for work – in other words, to ‘choose’ to enhance themselves and make themselves into 
a productive body, and brain. In early industrial work, the worker was fitted to the job, 
in the sense that it was recognized that different workers had different levels of skills and 
abilities. Techniques were devised to measure these and thereby ‘sort’ workers into their 
appropriate places within the labour market (Hollway, 1991). However, in the 
contemporary world, for many there has been a shift of responsibility towards the 
individual to make themselves ‘employable’, to take responsibility for their own well-
being such that they are ‘fit for work’ – effectively, to make of themselves a marketable 
asset that can be sold to the highest bidder in the employment market (Dale, 2012; Dale 
and Burrell, 2014). 
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This elision between productivity as being something that we do ‘at work’, and 
productivity being a characteristic that we have or are, can be discerned in entries in blog 
discussions amongst those who take modafinil/Provigil: 
‘[Modafinil] saves the day. I work full time, intricate work, drive, multi task person.... I’m the 
energizer bunny. Patricia Jung, August 13, 2008’; 
‘This turned me from a deep, suicidal depression into a happy, productive person in 2 
days....Paul Minor, April 7, 2010’; 
‘At first I only took it when I needed it, but finally I gave up having so many nonfunctional 
days that I started taking it every day....My days are much more fulfilling.... Bloomer, 
February 13, 2009’ 
(Source: modafinilorder.com; emphasis added)11 
We can link these commentaries on the benefits of the drug in terms of productivity back 
to the earlier discussion on the need for the flexibility of workers’ bodies. The imaginary 
of the plasticity of the brain, harnessed through the use of cognitive enhancers, becomes 
yoked to this impetus to continually provide potential for ever-greater performance and 
productivity. Thus the speculative nature of contemporary capitalism (Cooper, 2011) is 
worked out through the possibilities of enhancement: ‘The Real-Life Limitless Pill? Drug 
Helps Adults Learn as Fast as Children by Making the Brain More “Elastic”’ 
(Woollaston, 2014). Here the plasticity of the brain has its counterpart in the idea of 
human ‘resourcefulness’ – the idea that human qualities can be extended and enhanced, 
that they are not finite or fixed as are other assets: 
The working subject is always capable of ‘more’, of ‘becoming better’, of learning, creativity, 
knowledge and ‘talent’ beyond that which is currently performed. (Costea, Crump, and 
Amridis, 2007: 250) 
Thus, the sorts of traits that are explicitly valued here in the employee are also those that 
are targeted through pharmaceutical enhancement. Enhancement drugs therefore do not 
solely increase the productivity of an individual in quantitative terms, but also enable 
employees to demonstrate that they are constantly ‘“switched on”, present, alert, creative 
and enthused’ (Fleming, 2015: 67). In other words, employees have to not only be 
productive, but look productive. Enhancement drugs aid in this because of their potential 
to increase focus and attention, even where an employee would otherwise be demotivated 
or uninterested. For example, in one online article we are informed that ‘Lucas Baker, a 
Switzerland-based software engineer with a large tech company, takes nootropics every 
day. He says it helps him maintain focus, especially on projects he might otherwise put 
off. “When I find an unpleasant task, I can just power through it,” he says’ (Roose, 2015). 
In analysing the connections between imaginaries of cognitive enhancement and the 
valuation of production and performance, we can discern the interplay between the 
enhancement of the worker’s body and the wider political economy. Furthermore, 
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following Foucault (2008: 242), we can suggest that these imaginaries denote ‘an 
extension of the economy to the entire social field’. In the next section, we move from 
considering the individual social relations of enhancement to a broader reflection on what 
this means for a political economy of enhanced brains. 
Enhancing the economy 
As we have seen above, imaginaries of cognitive enhancement are closely entwined with 
the cultural norms and values of productivity and performance, and at the individual level 
there is an expectation that in order to legitimately participate within society, one has to 
be a productive person. In this section, we move from considering the individual 
(enhanced) brain to look at wider aspects of enhancement in relation to Hogle’s (2005: 
703) point about the ‘circuit of enterprise, biology, medicine and culture’. At a collective 
level, this means that bodies-brains are themselves seen as the source of productivity and 
performance for society. For example, a policy discussion paper on cognitive 
enhancement produced by the British Medical Association asserts the connection 
between the economy and cognition: 
An overall increase in cognitive ability in society could also lead to competitive advantages 
in the cut and thrust world of international trade and commerce. Fukuyama, who vehemently 
opposes the use of enhancements nevertheless acknowledges that ‘a society with higher 
average intelligence may be wealthier, insofar as productivity correlates with intelligence’. 
(British Medical Association, 2007: 18–19) 
This fits with a commonly reiterated view that so-called ‘advanced’ or post-industrial 
capitalist economies are more dependent on knowledge, and its associated qualities of 
creativity and innovation, sometimes described as the ‘knowledge economy’ or labelled 
‘cognitive capitalism’ (Vercellone, 2005). 
This impetus can also be seen in the film Limitless, where cognitive enhancement is 
presented as enabling and extending a number of intellectual capacities – from playing 
music to writing books – but its particular emphasis is on becoming so smart/cognitively 
enhanced as to be able to work in and command the world of corporate takeovers and 
financial markets. Moreover, in Limitless (and also in Lucy), cognitive enhancement 
enables the mind to ‘read’ everything that is going on around it, making the world legible 
to the human brain. As Eddie, the central character in Limitless, explains, ‘Everything I 
had ever read, heard, seen, was now organized and available’. To be able to ‘read’ the 
world is to be able to understand it and thereby have control over it, to predict and change 
it. Ultimately, this is a form of cognitive knowledge and control that is to be put to work 
in relation to the economy. 
Turning from the Hollywood fantasy of enhancement to its more mundane 
applications in everyday life, a commonality can be discerned in terms of the orientation 
towards the economy – especially in enabling the organization and management of 
employment. Although sleep may be regarded as a precondition for health and hence the 
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ability to work, it can also be seen as the absence of productive effort, a lack on the part 
of the body (Crary, 2013; Fleming, 2015; Wolf-Meyer, 2012). Accordingly, scientific 
efforts to understand sleep/wakefulness are not just aimed at offering treatments for 
individuals whose lives are plagued by an inability to regulate their patterns of waking/ 
sleeping, but are also of increasing relevance to organizations and the demands of an 
economic system that is geared towards 24/7 operation. It is in this context that Williams, 
Coveney, and Gabe (2013) discuss the desire for the customization of sleep, with the 
potential ultimately to make it optional. 
As mentioned earlier, the drug modafinil has become most touted as a cognitive 
enhancer, especially since a meta-analysis of it (Battleday and Brem, 2015) led to its 
being headlined as ‘the world’s first safe “smart drug”’ (Thomson, 2015).12 However, 
between its strictly medical use and the accounts of its enhancement properties (it has 
also been labelled the ‘real-life “Limitless” pill’ by online pharmacies and news media 
accounts), its prevalent use is as an everyday regulator of wakefulness. For example, 
under the headline ‘Sleepless in the City’, The Times of India carried the subtitle: 
‘Modafinil, the latest lifestyle drug in Delhi, makes owls out of human nightbirds...the 
flip side of Working Delhi’s graveyard shift’ (Sharma, 2004). It is developments such as 
this – accounts of how modafinil is used to ‘enhance’ the lives of those who take it, 
enabling them to cope with the demands of work – that best illustrate the political 
economy of pharmaceutical enhancement. 
In 2004, the pharmaceutical company Cephalon received official clearance from the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to promote Provigil (its branded version of the 
drug) as a means of alleviating excessive sleepiness and promoting wakefulness in 
connection with shift work disorder (SWD), a condition associated with a significant 
section of the workforce engaged in long working hours or nightshift work (Kroll-Smith, 
2003).13 In 2011, Cephalon ran a new promotional campaign for Nuvigil (another variant 
of modafinil) targeting prescribing clinicians as well as potential consumers suffering 
from excessive sleepiness associated with shift work. Deploying the caption ‘SUP- 
PORTING THOSE OF YOU WHO STAY AWAKE FOR THE REST OF US’, one 
image on its website (also reproduced in related promotional material) presented a picture 
of four individuals (three male and one female): a firefighter, two paramedics/ clinicians, 
and an emergency services worker. These familiar, respected, and important figures in 
the community were presented as professionals who make sacrifices on our behalf. 
Forfeiting what the rest of us enjoy (at least in theory) – that is, a ‘normal’ night’s sleep 
– they stay awake, responding to whatever emergency situation arises. The narrative here 
is that the drug enables these sorts of professionals to attain a better state of alertness or 
wakefulness whilst on duty, remaining vigilant, attentive, and thereby effective despite 
working at night or for long hours. Importantly, then, these individuals embody 
significant social values, such as possessing authority to deal with emergency situations, 
expertise, courage, duty to others, and caregiving. By supporting them in their night-shift 
work, the drug is also portrayed as upholding those values. Moreover, to the extent that 
drugs such as modafinil are portrayed as supporting key social values in the context of 
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work, such social values are, conversely, ‘borrowed’ by the adverts to legitimate their 
usage. 
The official Nuvigil webpages and related adverts in professional journals (such as 
Medical Marketing & Media or Pharmacy Today) offer a series of ‘user’ narratives, 
including that of Jenn, a 32-year-old emergency room nurse dealing with both shift work 
and the need to take responsibility for her family: ‘I’m so tired on my shift that it’s hard 
to do my job’. Moreover, as well as the general occupational information that her 
presence on the page presents (she appears dressed in a cap and gown and has a 
stethoscope around her neck), we are provided with some further individual background 
information. Jenn, we are told, ‘sleeps approximately 6.5 hours during the day, waking 
to run errands and make dinner for the family’. So, in addition to the social values one 
might typically associate with an ER nurse, Jenn not only makes a sacrifice by working 
at night (whilst the ‘rest of us’ sleep), but she also has responsibilities for others, 
foreshortening her daytime rest to perform domestic duties. The account suggests that to 
achieve this, she needs to manage the limitations of her own body, and appeals to 
modafinil as a solution to her problems. The drug offers a means of controlling her 
alertness/wakefulness, which in turn would allow her to do her job and manage the rest 
of her life and responsibilities. Once again, we can see an emphasis on the need for 
individual autonomy and responsibility – in this case over her performance in work and 
at home – coupled with a contribution to the collective good.14 
Of course, we all expect round-the-clock (24/7) availability when it comes to the 
emergency services. However, notably, the Nuvigil advertising campaign was later to 
include other rather different categories of workers – bartenders, waitresses, DJs, and 
warehouse staff – indicating a much broader scope of occupations deemed appropriate 
for the management of wakefulness. Thus, far from being reserved for people working in 
the essential or emergency services, the drug was available to support people working 
within all the services that modern consumer society takes for granted. On the one hand, 
then, the campaign reinforced the meaning and value of work in contemporary society, 
as we explored earlier. But on the other, it also indicated a managerial effort to realize a 
world in which employees’ wake/sleep cycles are organized according to the demands of 
production and the provision of services: the desire to create an always-on body. 
In terms of imaginaries, what is notable about the official promotional material for 
modafinil discussed here is how it contrasts with the commonplace media imagery of an 
enhanced brain, as noted earlier. Instead of a brain or head in effect abstracted from the 
rest of the body, we have depictions of real-life embodied subjects who have recourse to 
the drug in order to stay alert and focused on their work. The material does not promise 
to boost intelligence, but it does offer the prospect of enhancing the brain’s ability to cope 
with working extended hours or at night. This is not therefore an imaginary about 
becoming mentally exceptional through pharmaceuticals, but rather one that envisages 
normal working under conditions that would otherwise lead to a deterioration of 
cognitive abilities.15 
Finally, another example of the negative impact on work due to the limitations of the 
body occurs when individuals cross different time zones – namely, the problems of jet 
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lag. A number of remedies have been proposed to deal with jet lag, including the 
prescription and marketing of melatonin (the hormone that regulates sleep and 
wakefulness).16 In 2010, Cephalon applied to the FDA for the approval of Nuvigil as a 
possible treatment for jet lag, with business travellers being a particular target of interest 
(Pollack, 2010). From the perspective of the individual business person, the drug might 
seem attractive if it allowed them to stay alert and thus work effectively whilst crossing 
time zones, but from a managerial/organizational perspective, this application would help 
maximize use of human resources. In the event, the approval of the FDA was not 
forthcoming, but the fact of the application remains significant when considered in terms 
of the broader political economy of cognitive enhancement examined here.17 
In summary, whether it is a matter of enhancing the potential to cope with extended 
working hours, shift work, or business travel across different time zones, modafinil can 
be viewed as a putative contribution to the flexibility of labour, offering the prospect of 
suppressing the disorder to the system that the limited body-brain might otherwise 
precipitate, and thereby supporting the sort of 24/7 temporalities that are scrutinized by 
scholars such as Crary (2013), Fleming (2015), Williams, Coveney, and Gabe (2013), 
and Wolf-Meyer (2009). 
Conclusion 
Addressing the confluence of scientific ideas about the brain, pharmacological 
interventions in cognition, popular culture, and everyday life, we have considered 
imaginaries of cognitive enhancement in relation to three analytical themes. First, we 
considered the cultural representations of the brain in connection with the idea of 
plasticity – captured most graphically in images of morphing – and the representation of 
enhancement as a desirable, inevitable, and almost painless process in which the mind-
brain realizes its full potential and asserts its will over matter. Following this, we explored 
the social value accorded to productive employment and the contemporary (biopolitical) 
ethos of working on or managing oneself, particularly in respect of improving one’s 
productive performance through cognitive enhancement. In developing this, we looked 
at the moulding of the worker’s productive body-brain in relation to the demands of the 
economic system. Aiming to build upon previous sociological studies that have 
researched individuals’ motivations for and views about the decision to take cognitive 
enhancing drugs (Coveney, 2011; Smith and Land, 2014; Vrecko, 2013, 2015), we have 
sought to connect the individual worker and their labouring body-brain with the 
contemporary neoliberal biopolitical context. Here, we briefly consider the consequences 
of these arguments: first in relation to studies in the history of the human sciences, then 
in relation to the use of the concept of imaginaries and especially how this relates to the 
remnants of Cartesianism, which we have analysed in imaginaries of cognitive 
enhancement; and finally, we reflect on some of the implications in relation to the 
neoliberal working subject. 
The sociological approach adopted here has wider implications in terms of the history 
of the human sciences. Viewing the shaping of the human body in the context of work as 
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an accumulation strategy calls for an examination of the configuration or problematic 
that interlinks research into the body (including the brain) and associated developments 
in pharmacology; the pharmaceutical industry seeking to develop markets for its 
products; and the nexus of social, political, and economic factors that play a role in the 
constitution of problems or goals for which pharmacological or other technological 
solutions are sought. Seen in broader historical terms, there has of course been a long line 
of research endeavouring to understand the human body in order to better harness it to 
productive effort. Examples such as the 19th-century studies of fatigue (Rabinbach, 
1992), scientific management (the human body envisaged and managed as an appendage 
to productive machinery), and the emergence of the field of work psychology (Hollway, 
1991) help set current discussions of work and human enhancement in a broader 
perspective. In this article, we concentrate on the relations between the notions of brain 
plasticity incorporated in cognitive enhancement, and how this relates to the specific 
conditions of contemporary employment. 
To this end, we contend that imaginaries are of key importance – in terms of the 
imagined goals of scientific research (such as the search for an “on/off switch” in brain 
research); the ways in which these ideas are represented and interpreted more broadly in 
society, promoted, and marketed; and the part they play in the deliberations, 
sensemaking, and justifications whereby individuals orientate themselves in terms of 
their future possibilities for action. Accordingly, in this article we have considered how 
the imaginaries of pharmacological cognitive enhancement reflect and reproduce a 
number of key aspects of the contemporary cultural, socio-economic, and biopolitical 
landscape. Prevalent in a diverse array of sources, imaginaries are not mere abstract 
fantasies, but rather a key part of how individuals orientate themselves to their future 
possibilities: In order to act upon the world, individuals need to be able to imagine this 
action and its outcomes. Imaginaries are therefore performative. There is thus an 
anticipatory and promissory aspect to contemporary imaginaries about the brain that 
seems to suggest that not only will we be able to better understand ourselves as humans 
by understanding the brain, but also this knowledge and its associated techniques will 
enable us to govern ourselves and human affairs in general, in a better way (Rose and 
Abi-Rached, 2013). 
We would argue that through the use of the concept of imaginaries, there is a 
possibility to move away from dualistic conceptions, such as mind/body, as well as to 
better understand the implications of such conceptualizations. We have analysed the 
Cartesian strand that runs through the imaginary of cognitive enhancement and splits 
cognition or intellect from the (rest of the) body. One consequence is that the focus on 
the enhanced brain serves to distance not only the individual’s body but also the 
collective, the social body. Erasing the social in this way not only reinforces the 
individualist subject position of neoliberalism, but also diverts attention away from 
substantive consideration of the coercive pressures stemming from the policies and 
conditions of employment that might drive individuals towards cognitive enhancement. 
The Cartesian strand that we perceive in imaginaries of cognitive enhancement sees 
technology as a means of surpassing the biological limitations of the body in order to 
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achieve control through the exercise of the mind, along with its associated knowledge 
and rationality. Both Limitless and Lucy trade on the idea of unlocking the brain’s 
potential through technology in the shape of a pharmacological substance, in the process 
acquiring power to act upon and hence manage the world, rendering it subject to 
organization and thereby control. Thus we might argue that the other side of the plasticity 
of the brain is the increased malleability of the world. In this connection, it is useful to 
note the emphasis on progress through technology that is a key trope of modern culture. 
Underlying this is a predominantly humanistic approach to technology as the product of 
human knowledge to harness the resources of the earth to human desires and designs. 
Moreover, the liberal view of enhancing the brain as individual ‘free’ choice is allied to 
the longstanding North Atlantic/Occidental notion that the human species inevitably 
seeks to better itself, to improve on the present by embracing the future – what might be 
seen as the ‘ascent of man [sic]’ – as depicted in Limitless, or even a move to a posthuman 
or transhuman future, as represented by Lucy. This suggests that it is somehow ‘natural’ 
for individuals to better themselves, to realize their potential, and thereby draws upon 
and reproduces the neoliberal view of the autonomous subject who possesses free will 
and, in taking responsibility for their own fate, acts as their own ‘unit of enterprise’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 226). 
However, complementing this focus on the neoliberal subject, we have also considered 
enhancement from the perspective of the broader economic system and the accumulation 
of ‘human capital’, to argue that the ‘productive body’ is an economic entity, shaped in 
relation to other bodies and technologies and the demands that the system generates. 
Indeed, organizations have long demanded flexibility on the part of the workforce, to 
adopt patterns of working according to the demands of the systems of production. In this 
light, cognitive enhancement might appear as yet another means of proving or realizing 
one’s flexibility to fit with the system, as a way to create the always-on body.18 It is no 
mere accident or contingent matter of biochemistry that the drug modafinil, which is 
officially prescribed to keep people awake when they are meant to be focused and alert, 
also appears attractive to those seeking or promoting cognitive enhancement (see, for 
example, Coveney, 2011; Williams et al., 2008). Preventing inadvertent sleep during the 
day (narcolepsy), avoiding sleepiness whilst working at night (shift work disorder), 
avoiding or controlling excessive daytime sleepiness, or seeking to increase focus and 
alertness on demand (enhancement) all represent efforts to manage the functioning of the 
brain towards productive or performative ends. Biochemistry may be part of the equation, 
but so too is the contemporary biopolitical ethos in which the accumulation of capital is 
increasingly dependent on the accumulation of flexible brains. 
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1. This view of plasticity goes well beyond recognizing that the juvenile human brain 
goesthrough a significant process of development, to emphasize the changes that take place 
in the brain throughout an individual’s whole life course. The concept encompasses the idea 
of an openness to influences from both within and outside the body, both environmental and 
– importantly – self-determined, including the effects of brain training, various therapies, 
harnessing neurofeedback loops, and so on (see, for instance, Brenninkmeijer, 2010), and 
includes in its effects both individual and potential epigenetic changes. This, then, provides a 
view of opportunities and threats for the future that focus on the brain (Papadopoulos, 2011; 
Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). 
2. The term ‘smart drugs’ is a potentially misleading phrase for a number of reasons. First, in 
thisuse ‘smart’ refers to the assumed increase in cognitive capability, but promoting 
wakefulness or alertness is not the same as the increase of intellect. Second, ‘smart drugs’ has 
also been used to describe the search to develop drugs that target and treat only certain 
symptoms – in other words, the drugs themselves rather than the outcomes are ‘smart’. Third, 
there are no drugs licensed to be prescribed or marketed as ‘smart drugs’. Where drugs are 
taken for their assumed cognitive effects, these are drugs that are prescribed for other 
conditions (such as narcolepsy or ADHD) and taken off-prescription. 
3. And indeed ‘an ill for every pill’, with the argument that illness and diseases come to beshaped 
such that they ‘fit’ pharmacological substances that have been developed. 
4. The articles were identified by utilizing the Nexis database of news publications; our 
searchterms included ‘modafinil’ or ‘smart drugs’ coupled with ‘brain’. The sample included 
the following UK national publications: The Guardian and The Observer, The Times and The 
Sunday Times, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph, the Daily 
Mail and Mail on Sunday, The Sun, The Mirror and The Sunday Mirror, the Daily Express 
and Sunday Express, the i, and the Daily Star. 
5. It is a matter of public record that Cephalon was reprimanded by the FDA for 
providingproduct information, reinforced by the behaviour of sales staff, that promoted the 
drug for general symptoms of sleepiness and fatigue well beyond its official authorization 
(US Department of Justice, 2008). In other words, the pharmacological manipulation of the 
brain by individuals who felt tired or insufficiently alert when they wished to be alert and 
attentive was becoming endorsed as a matter of individual choice. 
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6. Although Alan Glynn, the author of the original book that inspired the film (The Dark Fields), 
is clear that it was an entirely fictional drug. Similarly, the drug from Lucy, CPH4, whilst 
itself a fictional drug, is claimed by the film’s director Luc Besson to be based upon a real 
chemical that is produced in pregnancy to promote the growth and development of the foetus. 
Web discussions show that individuals have sought for this substance online and sometimes 
unscrupulous retailers will claim to sell it, whilst others claim that it is modafinil that is the 
real source of the fictional drug. 
7. Psychiatric News (2007) 42(7): 15, available at: https://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/ 
pdf/10.1176/pn.2007.42.issue-7. 
8. Adderall is a mixture of amphetamine salts, primarily used to treat ADHD. 
9. Nootropics are drugs, supplements, and nutritional products that are claimed to 
improveaspects of mental function (such as memory, motivation, and attention). The term 
was coined by Corneliu Giurgea from Greek words meaning ‘mind’ and ‘to bend or turn’. 
10. https://metro.co.uk/2016/06/01/smart-drugs-are-coming-to-the-office-to-make-you-
sharperstronger-better-5917892/ (accessed 20th November 2019). 
11. https://web.archive.org/web/20150215220209/http://modafinilorder.com/modalert-reviews/ 
12. For a critical response to this study, see Repantis, Maier, and Heuser (2016). 
13. Cephalon was acquired by Teva in 2011. ‘Shift work disorder’ is a medicalization of 
thedisruptions to their sleep and wake cycles that shift workers commonly experience, 
including the inability to sleep during the day or ‘excessive sleepiness’ whilst on night shift. 
This has not been a prescribed use of the drug in Europe since 2011, when the European 
Medicines Agency decided that the potential side effects of modafinil were such that shift 
work disorder should not be included. Direct marketing of pharmaceuticals to consumers is 
only legally permitted in the USA and New Zealand. The official website for Nuvigil 
(www.nuvigil.com), the branded version of modafinil that superseded its forerunner Provigil, 
offered information concerning a variety of conditions associated with excessive sleepiness 
and for which the drug might be prescribed. It suggested that some 15 million Americans 
work outside the 9 to 5 regimen of other employees, and that up to 25% of them might have 
SWD. 
14. ‘Checking Beds, Ready for Her Own’ (2012, 1 July) Medical Marketing & Media, available 
at: https://www.mmm-online.com/home/channel/features/100-agencies-draftfcb-healthcare/; 
see also, Pharmacy Today (2013, February: 19). 
15. Of course, in accordance with our earlier discussion of morphing and representations 
ofenhancement, this is not to suggest that modafinil might counter the other deleterious 
impacts that shift work has on the body – for which there is a growing amount of evidence. 
Rather, in a sense the imaginary on offer presents the bodily consequences of shift work as 
merely one of excessive sleepiness, thereby potentially diverting attention away from its more 
serious health effects. 
16. An example of the discussion of this can be seen in Fleming (2017). 
17. That said, there is continued online discussion of the merits of the drug for this purpose. 
18. One possible further socio-economic factor in the future potential demand and take-up 
ofcognitive enhancers stems from the increasing automation of work and the substitution of 
human jobs by technology. 
Bloomfield and Dale 23 
References 
Abraham, J. (2010) ‘Pharmaceuticalization of Society in Context: Theoretical, Empirical and 
Health Dimensions’, Sociology 44(4): 603–22. 
Academy of Medical Sciences (2012) Human Enhancement and the Future of Work: Report From 
a Joint Workshop Hosted by the Academy of Medical Sciences, the British Academy, the Royal 
Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society, available at: https://acmedsci.ac.uk/policy/ 
policy/human-enhancement-and-the-future-of-work. 
Battleday, R. M. and Brem, A. K. (2015) ‘Modafinil for Cognitive Neuroenhancement in Healthy 
Non-Sleep-Deprived Subjects: A Systematic Review’, European Neuropsychopharmacology 
25(11): 1865–81. 
Beaconsfield, P. (1980) ‘A Pill for Every Ill’, The Lancet 315(8163): 315. 
Bloomfield, B. and Dale, K. (2015) ‘Fit for Work? Redefining “Normal” and “Extreme” Through 
Human Enhancement Technologies’, Organization 22(4): 552–69. 
Bloomfield, B. P. and Doolin, B. (2011) ‘Imagination and Technoscientific Innovations: 
Governance of Transgenic Cows in New Zealand’, Social Studies of Science 41(1): 59–83. 
British Medical Association (2007) Boosting Your Brainpower: Ethical Aspects of Cognitive 
Enhancements. London: BMA. 
Brenninkmeijer, J. (2010) ‘Taking Care of One’s Brain: How Manipulating the Brain Changes 
People’s Selves’, History of the Human Sciences 23(1): 107–26. 
Busfield, J. (2010) ‘“A Pill for Every Ill”: Explaining the Expansion in Medicine Use’, Social 
Science & Medicine 70(6): 934–41. 
Cadwalladr, C. (2015, 15 February) ‘Students Used to Take Drugs to Get High. Now They Take 
Them to Get Higher Grades’, The Observer, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/soci 
ety/2015/feb/15/students-smart-drugs-higher-grades-adderall-modafinil. 
Clay, X. (2012, 12 August) ‘Drug-Taking: Think What We’d Achieve If We Never Slept a Wink’, 
The Telegraph, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/9503763/Drug-
takingthink-what-wed-achieve-ifwe-never-slept-a-wink.html. 
Cooper, M. (2011) Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Costea, B., Crump, N., and Amiridis, K. (2007) ‘Managerialism and “Infinite Human 
Resourcefulness”: A Commentary Upon the “Therapeutic Habitus”, “Derecognition of 
Finitude” and the Modern Sense of Self’, Journal for Cultural Research 11(3): 245–64. 
Coveney, C. M. (2011) ‘Cognitive Enhancement? Exploring Modafinil Use in Social Context’, in 
M. Pickersgill and I. Van Keulen (eds) Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences. Bingley: 
Emerald, pp. 203–28. 
Coveney, C., Gabe, J., and Williams, S. (2011) ‘The Sociology of Cognitive Enhancement: 
Medicalisation and Beyond’, Health Sociology Review 20(4): 381–93. 
Coveney, C. M., Nerlich, B., and Martin, P. (2009) ‘Modafinil in the Media: Metaphors, 
Medicalisation and the Body’, Social Science & Medicine 68(3): 487–95. 
Crary, J. (2013) 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep. London: Verso. 
Dale, K. (2001) Anatomising Embodiment and Organisation Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Dale, K. (2012) ‘The Employee as “Dish of the Day”: The Ethics of the Consuming/Consumed 
Self in Human Resource Management’, Journal of Business Ethics 111(1): 13–24. 
24 History of the Human Sciences XX(X) 
Dale, K. and Burrell, G. (2014) ‘Being Occupied: An Embodied Re-reading of Organizational 
“Wellness”’, Organization 21(2): 159–77. 
Dawney, L. (2011) ‘Social Imaginaries and Therapeutic Self-Work: The Ethics of the Embodied 
Imagination’, The Sociological Review 59(3): 535–52. 
Dean, J. (2013, 22 November) ‘In the City That Never Sleeps...Traders Stay Up on “Smart” Drugs’, 
The Times, available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/in-the-city-that-neversleeps-
traders-stay-up-on-smart-drugs-bg2cts90rd8. 
Delgado, A., Rommetveit, K., Barcelo´, M., and Lemkow, L. (2012) ‘Imagining High-Tech 
Bodies: 
Science Fiction and the Ethics of Enhancement’, Science Communication 34(2): 200–40. 
Dietz, P., Soyka, M., and Franke, A. G. (2016) ‘Pharmacological Neuroenhancement in the Field 
of Economics—Poll Results From an Online Survey’, Frontiers in Psychology 7: 1–8. 
Diver, T. (2017, 24 June) ‘Let Students Use Study Drugs and Let’s Sell Them at Boots, Says 
Cambridge Scientist’, The Independent, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/student/ 
news/let-students-use-study-drugs-modafinil-narcotics-sell-at-boots-top-cambridge-
scientistbarbara-a7806111.html. 
Elliott, C. (2003) Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream. New York: 
W. W. Norton. 
Farah, M. J., Illes, J., Cook-Deegan, R., Gardner, H., Kandel, E., King, P., Parens, E., Sahakian, 
B., and Wolpe, P. R. (2004) ‘Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do and What Should 
We Do?’, Nature Reviews (Neuroscience) 5(5): 421–5. 
Farr, M. (2014, 27 May) ‘Public Servants Used Drug, Modafinil, to Stay Awake to Complete the 
Federal Budget on Time’, News.com.au, available at: https://www.news.com.au/national/pub 
lic-servants-used-drug-modafinil-to-stay-awake-to-complete-the-federal-budget-on-time/ 
news-story/8bc517ef259fbfbb882ca68b3bd405a4. 
Featherstone, M. (1991) ‘The Body in Consumer Culture’, in M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth, and 
B. S. Turner (eds) The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE, pp. 170–96. 
Fleming, N. (2017, 30 January) ‘Is It Safe to Take Melatonin for Jet Lag?’, The Guardian, 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/jan/30/is-it-safe-to-use-melato 
nin-for-jet-lag-insomnia. 
Fleming, P. (2015) The Mythology of Work: How Capitalism Persists Despite Itself. London: Pluto 
Press. 
Flew, T. (2014) ‘Six Theories of Neoliberalism’, Thesis Eleven 122(1): 49–71. 
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan. London: 
Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France, 1978–1979, ed. 
M. Senellart, trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fox, N. J. and Ward, K. J. (2008) ‘Pharma in the Bedroom ...and the Kitchen. ...The 
Pharmaceuticalisation of Daily Life’, Sociology of Health & Illness 30(6): 856–68. 
Frosch, D. L., Krueger, P. M., Hornik, R. C., Cronholm, P. F., and Barg, F. K. (2007) ‘Creating 
Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content Analysis of Television Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising’, Annals of Family Medicine 5(1): 6–13. 
Gatens, M. (1996) Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. London: Routledge. 
Bloomfield and Dale 25 
Greely, H., Sahakian, B., Harris, J., Kessler, R. C., Gazzaniga, M., Campbell, P., and Farah, M. J. 
(2008) ‘Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the Healthy’, Nature 
456(7223): 702–5. 
Gue´ry, F. and Deleule, D. (2014) The Productive Body, ed. and trans. P. Barnard and S. Shapiro. 
Alresford: Zero Books. 
Harvey, D. (1998) ‘The Body as an Accumulation Strategy’, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 16(4): 401–21. 
Harvey, D. and Haraway, D. (1995) ‘Nature, Politics, and Possibilities: A Debate and Discussion 
With David Harvey and Donna Haraway’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
13(5): 507–27. 
Hogle, L. F. (2005) ‘Enhancement Technologies and the Body’, Annual Review of Anthropology 
34: 695–716. 
Hollway, W. (1991) Work Psychology and Organizational Behaviour: Managing the Individual at 
Work. London: SAGE. 
‘How (and Why) to Use Nootropics to Boost Productivity and Performance’ (2016, 22 December) 
MoneyMiniBlog, available at: https://moneyminiblog.com/productivity/smart-drugs/. 
Joelving, F. (2011, 2 November) ‘Modafinil Has Mixed Effects on Dozy Surgeons’, Reuters, 
available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/health-us-modafinil/modafinil-has-mixed-
effectson-dozy-surgeons-idUKTRE7A17ZU20111102. 
Karim, F. (2017, 30 December) ‘A Drop of LSD Is “New Brain Booster”’, The Times, available 
at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/a-drop-of-lsd-is-new-brain-booster-w2kbtw559. 
Kroll-Smith, S. (2003) ‘Popular Media and “Excessive Daytime Sleepiness”: A Study of Rhetorical 
Authority in Medical Sociology’, Sociology of Health & Illness 25(6): 625–43. 
Krueger, G. P. and Leaman, H. M. (2011) Effects of Psychoactive Chemicals on Commercial 
Driver Health and Performance: Stimulants, Hypnotics, Nutritional, and Other Supplements. 
Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, available at: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onli 
nepubs/ctbssp/ctbssp_syn_19.pdf. 
Kuchler, H. (2017, 10 August) ‘How Silicon Valley Rediscovered LSD’, Financial Times, 
available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0a5a4404-7c8e-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c. 
Laurance, J. (1995, 30 October) ‘Mechanical heart hastens end of human transplants’, The Times. 
Lay, K. (2015, 20 August) ‘Smart Drug Helps You to Sleep Less and Think More’, The Times, 
available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/health/news/article4532339.ece. 
Le Doeuff, M. (1989) The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. C. Gordon. London: Athlone. 
Lemke, T. (2002) ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’, Rethinking Marxism 14(3): 
49–64. 
Louv, J. (2012, 12 December) ‘How Smart Drugs and Cybernetics Could Create a Superhuman 
Workforce’, Motherboard, available at: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvvy9y/howsmart-
drugs-and-cybernetics-could-create-a-superhuman-workforce. 
Macnaghten, P., Kearnes, M. B., and Wynne, B. (2005) ‘Nanotechnology, Governance, and Public 
Deliberation: What Role for the Social Sciences?’, Science Communication 27(2): 268–91. 
Margo, J. (2000, 24 June) ‘Wake to a Bright New Day/STAYING ALIVE’, The Weekend 
Australian, p. R31. 
26 History of the Human Sciences XX(X) 
Martin, E. (1994) Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture From the Days of 
Polio to the Age of AIDS. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Martin, E. (2006) ‘The Pharmaceutical Person’, BioSocieties 1(3): 273–87. 
Moreno, J. D. (2008) Mind Wars: Brain Science and the Military in the 21st Century. New York: 
Bellevue Literary Press. 
‘Nootropics: Can These Smart Drugs Super-Charge Your Career?’ (2013, 16 May) Fox News, 
available at: https://www.foxnews.com/health/nootropics-can-these-smart-drugs-supercharge-
your-career. 
O’Connor, C. and Joffe, H. (2015) ‘How the Public Engages With Brain Optimization: The 
MediaMind Relationship’, Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(5): 712–43. 
Papadopoulos, D. (2011) ‘The Imaginary of Plasticity: Neural Embodiment, Epigenetics and 
Ecomorphs’, The Sociological Review 59(3): 432–56. 
Petrow, S. (2013, 4 November) ‘The Drugs of Work-Performance Enhancement’, The Atlantic, 
available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/the-drugs-of-work-perfor 
mance-enhancement/281055/. 
‘The PharmaceuticalPathto a SuperhumanWorkforce’(2012,23 November)Financial Times, p. 12. 
Pitts-Taylor, V. (2010) ‘The Plastic Brain: Neoliberalism and the Neuronal Self’, Health 14(6): 
635–52. 
Pollack, A. (2010, 29 March) ‘Regulators Reject a Drug Maker’s Plan to Use Its Alertness Pill to 
Overcome Jet Lag’, New York Times, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/busi 
ness/30drug.html?_r¼0. 
Rabinbach, A. (1992) The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Racine, E. and Forlini, C. (2010) ‘Cognitive Enhancement, Lifestyle Choice or Misuse of 
Prescription Drugs? Ethics Blind Spots in Current Debates’, Neuroethics 3(1): 1–4. 
Rasmussen, N. (2008) On Speed: The Many Lives of Amphetamine. New York: New York 
University Press. 
Repantis, D., Maier, L. J., and Heuser, I. (2016) ‘Correspondence Arising: Modafinil for Cognitive 
Neuroenhancement in Health [sic] Non-Sleep-Deprived-Subjects’, European 
Neuropsychopharmacology 26(2): 392–3. 
Repantis, D., Schlattmann, P., Laisney, O., and Heuser, I. (2010) ‘Modafinil and Methylphenidate 
for Neuroenhancement in Healthy Individuals: A Systematic Review’, Pharmacological 
Research 62(3): 187–206. 
Roose, K. (2015, 4 March) ‘I Tried Silicon Valley’s Favorite “Brain-Enhancing” Drugs’, Splinter, 
available at: https://splinternews.com/i-tried-silicon-valleys-favorite-brain-enhancing-
drugs1793845948. 
Rose, N. (2007) ‘Molecular Biopolitics, Somatic Ethics and the Spirit of Biocapital’, Social Theory 
& Health 5(1): 3–29. 
Rose, N. and Abi-Rached, J. M. (2013) Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of 
the Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Sawday, J. (1995) The Body Emblazoned: dissection and the human body in Renaissance culture 
. 
London: Routledge. 
Bloomfield and Dale 27 
Sharma, J. (2004, 14 July) ‘Sleepless in the City’, Times of India, available at: https://timesofindia. 
indiatimes.com/delhi-times/Sleepless-in-the-city/articleshow/777288.cms. 
Singh, I. (2007) ‘Not Just Naughty: 50 Years of Stimulant Drug Advertising’, in A. Tone and E. 
Siegel Watkins (eds) Medicating Modern America: Prescription Drugs in History. New York: 
New York University Press, pp. 131–55. 
Smith, C. and Land, C. (2014) ‘Pharmacological Routes to Everyday Exceptionality’, Culture and 
Organization 20(4): 269–87. 
Smith, C. and Riach, K. (2016) ‘Drug Taking and Employment: Exploring the Employable Citizen 
in UK Policy’, Sociology 50(1): 24–42. 
Sobchack, V., ed. (2000) Meta Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture of QuickChange. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sugden, C., Housden, C. R., Aggarwal, R., Sahakian, B., and Darzi, A. (2012) ‘Effect of 
Pharmacological Enhancement on the Cognitive and Clinical Psychomotor Performance of 
Sleep-Deprived Doctors: A Randomized Controlled Trial’, Annals of Surgery 255(2): 
222–7. 
Talbot, M. (2009, 20 April) ‘Brain Gain: The Underground World of “Neuroenhancing” Drugs’, 
New Yorker, available at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/04/27/brain-gain. 
Taylor, C. (2002) ‘Modern Social Imaginaries’, Public Culture 14(1): 91–124. 
Thomson, H. (2015, 20 August) ‘Narcolepsy Medication Modafinil Is World’s First Safe “Smart 
Drug”’, The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/aug/20/narco 
lepsy-medication-modafinil-worlds-first-safe-smart-drug. 
Tone, A. (2009) The Age of Anxiety: A History of America’s Turbulent Affair With Tranquilizers. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Turner, B. S. (1984) The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
US Department of Justice (2008, 29 September) ‘Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to Pay 
$425 Million & Enter Plea to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Marketing’, available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-civ-860.html. 
Vercellone, C. (2005, November) ‘The Hypothesis of Cognitive Capitalism’, paper presented at 
the Historical Materialism Annual Conference, Birkbeck College and SOAS, London, available 
at: https://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00273641/. 
Vrecko, S. (2013) ‘Just How Cognitive Is “Cognitive Enhancement”? On the Significance of 
Emotions in University Students’ Experiences With Study Drugs’, AJOB Neuroscience 4(1): 
4–12. 
Vrecko, S. (2015) ‘Everyday Drug Diversions: A Qualitative Study of the Illicit Exchange and 
Non-Medical Use of Prescription Stimulants on a University Campus’, Social Science & 
Medicine 131: 297–304. 
Williams, S. J., Coveney, C. M., and Gabe, J. (2013) ‘Medicalisation or Customisation? Sleep, 
Enterprise and Enhancement in the 24/7 Society’, Social Science & Medicine 79: 40–7. 
Williams, S. J., Seale, C., Boden, S., Lowe, P., and Steinberg, D. L. (2008) ‘Waking Up to 
Sleepiness: Modafinil, the Media and the Pharmaceuticalisation of Everyday/Night Life’, 
Sociology of Health & Illness 30(6): 839–55. 
28 History of the Human Sciences XX(X) 
Wolf-Meyer, M. (2009) ‘Precipitating Pharmakologies and Capital Entrapments: Narcolepsy and 
the Strange Cases of Provigil and Xyrem’, Medical Anthropology 28(1): 11–30. 
Wolf-Meyer, M. J. (2012) The Slumbering Masses: Sleep, Medicine, and Modern American Life. 
London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Woollaston, V. (2014, 31 March) ‘The Real-Life Limitless Pill? Drug Helps Adults Learn as Fast 




Brian P. Bloomfield is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Organisation, Work and 
Technology at Lancaster University, UK. His research interests include social imaginaries and 
technoscientific innovations, debates about human enhancement technologies, and posthumanism. 
He has published in the fields of organization studies, sociology, and science and technology 
studies. 
Karen Dale is Professor of Organisation Studies in the Department of Organisation, Work and 
Technology at Lancaster University, UK. She has written about embodiment, architecture, space, 
and social materiality related to organization studies. Her current research is into performance 
enhancing drugs at work, and includes reports for the European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work. 
